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1. Overview  
In the 1990s, security threats in the Western Balkans were analysed primarily through national 
lenses, with neighbouring states perceiving each other as their main threats. Since then, there 
has been a transition toward an understanding that there are common threats, whose 
appropriate tackling requires transborder coordination and cooperation (Knezović et al., 2018). 
The strategic documents of Western Balkan countries state that regional cooperation is essential 
to their national and overall regional security – and in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration 
(Jakešević, 2019). 
Key priorities in regional security and justice cooperation are fighting transborder organised 
crime, combating corruption, cooperation on migration, asylum and refugees and protection of 
fundamental rights (Bechev et al., 2015). This involves cooperation among police, prosecutors, 
border control and other officials working in security and justice sectors. Components of 
coordination and cooperation include:  
 Legal frameworks that lay the foundation for inter-agency, bi-lateral, regional and 
multilateral cooperation 
 Joint investigation teams, comprised of professionals from police, customs and judicial 
authorities, aimed at strengthening transborder cooperation in conducting investigations 
and exchanging information 
 Joint operational databases on cases of organised crime that could facilitate 
investigations; and joint risk analysis 
 Joint training and educational activities that can present best practices in the field and 
allow for sharing of experiences and trust-building 
 Information sharing through regular meetings or networks 
 Personal contacts and other non-formal dimensions of cooperation that could allow for 
more flexible and speedier cooperation 
There have been successes in regional security cooperation, attributable in large part to several 
regional level initiatives (Emini and Marku, 2019) (see below). Cooperation in the Western 
Balkans has also advanced at the bilateral level. Between the years 2002-2015, the 
governments, internal ministries and police of Albania and Kosovo, for example, have signed 21 
agreements, memoranda of understanding and common protocols (Ibraj, 2016). These have 
included documents for mutual legal assistance, parallel investigations, extradition and other 
forms of police and judicial cooperation (Ibaj, 2016). Cooperation between Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo has often taken the form of informal platforms for communication, 
in the absence of formal, bilateral agreements in the security sector (Hoxha and Emini, 2014).  
Inter-institutional cooperation at the national level is also necessary (Bačanović and Hristovski, 
2018). In North Macedonia, for example, problems with coordination of the country’s security 
structures remains. The Centre of Crisis Management, established with the task of coordinating 
the security community, has yet to deliver results (Gjurovski, 2018). 
The vast majority of literature on mechanisms to coordinate security and justice work in Western 
Balkans centres on the regional level. As such, this report discusses coordination and 
cooperation efforts and mechanisms primarily at the regional level. Within the time-frame 
allocated, it was not possible to engage in in-depth research on each of the individual countries 
within the Western Balkans to uncover country level coordination mechanisms. 
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Regional level security and justice coordination and cooperation mechanisms and initiatives 
include: 
 The Stability Pact/Regional Cooperation Council 
 Southeast European Cooperative Initiative/ Southeast European Law Enforcement 
Centre 
 Regional Anticorruption Initiative 
 Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative 
 Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association 
 Police Cooperation Centre 
 Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group 
 The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and 
Light Weapon  
 Integrative Internal Security Governance 
 Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism initiative   
 The Horizontal Facility   
Despite much progress in developing regional mechanisms to address security issues, the 
Western Balkans has still been identified as deficient in combatting serious organised crime, with 
gaps in regional coordination and in cooperation mechanisms (UNODC, 2019; Ademi, 2018). 
Challenges include uneven cooperation in the region, inadequate levels of trust to share 
sensitive information and to develop a community and common identity, and varying stages of 
development among the countries of the region (Emini and Marku, 2019). 
There needs to be further specific efforts to promote innovative training of officials in security and 
justice sector-related agencies, such that they can better deal with complex, transborder security 
problems that require cooperation (Dokos, 2017). Efforts to promote sharing of experiences and 
interactions are also required not only in the security and justice sectors but among the general 
public. This could help to foster a greater sense of security community and trust, required to 
enhance a regional identity and regional cooperation (Emini and Marku, 2019; Cruise and Grillot, 
2013). Establishing or strengthening the role of authorised contact persons/units for cooperation 
and information exchange could also help to improve cooperation at national, regional and 
multilateral levels (IOM, 2015). 
2. Characteristics of regional cooperation 
External or locally-driven, top-down or bottom-up 
Regional cooperation in the Western Balkans has developed through external and locally owned 
initiatives.  Externally driven initiatives for regional cooperation, which comprise the most 
common form, have been promoted in large part by the EU and EU member states (Bechev et 
al., 2015; Prezelj, 2013). Locally owned initiatives have been proposed instead by governments 
or civil society actors within the region (Bechev et al., 2015).  
Forms of regional cooperation can also be distinguished between top-down and bottom-up 
initiatives. Top-down initiatives are mainly political and implemented by governments; whereas, 
bottom-up initiatives can consist of cooperation between governments, if they were externally 
motivated, or cooperation between civil society actors, if they were driven by local actors (Bechev 
et al., 2015). In some cases, while regional cooperation initiatives may have begun as externally 
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driven, they later became locally owned, such as in the case of the Migration, Asylum, Refugees 
Regional Initiative (MARRI). For further discussion of MARRI, see the Section on mechanisms 
and initiatives. 
Enhanced cooperation in the security sector in the Western Balkans is driven in large part by EU 
objectives (Emini and Marku, 2019; Jakešević, 2019). EU conditionality is considered to be an 
external, top-down approach (Jakešević, 2019).  It is important, however, for countries in the 
Western Balkans to acknowledge that regional cooperation is for the benefit of the region and its 
citizens, and should be driven internally from the region (Emini and Marku, 2019).  
Local top-down initiatives have expanded in recent years (Becheve et al., 2015). (See the 
Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism initiative in the Section on mechanisms and initiatives, for 
example). Regional countries have been taking on more responsibility in directing, managing and 
financing existing initiatives (Prezelj, 2013). Despite higher local ownership, there remains a lack 
of political will, inadequate commitment and financial and human resources to deepen regional 
cooperation (Bechev et al, 2015; Prezelj, 2013). The importance of external actors in boosting 
regional dynamics and regional cooperation thus remains essential (Jakešević, 2019; Bechev et 
al., 2019). 
Local, bottom-up initiatives have intensified and contributed to a growing culture of regional 
cooperation (Bechev et al., 2019). Such civil society-led initiatives work toward common goals 
and often extend beyond the mandates of acting governments. They often tackle politically 
contested issues, such as overcoming past conflicts through transitional justice mechanisms 
(Bechev et al., 2015). It can be challenging however to manage large regional coalitions of civil 
society actors and to accumulate necessary resources (Bechev et al., 2015). 
Variation in cooperation 
Since not all countries in the Western Balkans face identical security threats, it can be 
challenging to envisage a uniform type of cooperation suitable for all regional actors. Rather, the 
level of cooperation often depends on the commonality of security threats with which they 
are dealing (Knezović et al., 2018). 
Cooperation tends to be significantly more developed with bordering countries within the Western 
Balkans, as they deal with similar issues. For example, the long, shared border between Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Croatia implies the importance of cooperation between border police units 
(Knezović et al., 2018). Similarly, the promotion of bilateral police cooperation between Kosovo 
and Serbia is important in order to combat cross-border challenges and risks (Ademi, 2018). 
Serbia and Croatia have established deeper criminal police cooperation due to their need to 
tackle organised crime (Knezović et al., 2018). Cooperation with Albania and North Macedonia is 
also important to combat trafficking in humans and drugs (Knezović et al., 2018). 
3. Sectoral cooperation 
Key priorities in regional security and justice cooperation include: fighting transborder organised 
crime, combating corruption, cooperation on migration, asylum and refugees and protection of 
fundamental rights (Bechev et al., 2015). This requires cooperation on the part of various security 
and justice actors. 
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Police cooperation 
Regional cooperation in the field of policing seems to be improving noticeably, moving away from 
patterns in place during the conflict (Knezović et al., 2018). Police cooperation in the Western 
Balkans is considered as a tool to overcome the challenges of the past while strengthening 
efforts to counter organised crime and other security threats (Hoxha and Emini, 2014). Increases 
in cooperation can be attributed to the role of external actors, primarily EU and NATO accession 
processes and conditionality; and to internal politics, with the rise of new political elites who are 
more supportive of new types of cooperation (Knezović et al., 2018).  
Regional cooperation between the security sectors in general, and particularly between regional 
police forces, is considered to be essential for the integration of the Western Balkans into the 
European Union (Ademi, 2018). Progress has been made since 2000, with improvements in 
formal cooperation within the framework of important international organisations, such as 
Interpol, Europol (international organisations with the mandate to prevent and combat criminality) 
or the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association (Knezović et al., 2018).  In the case of 
Kosovo, however, denied membership in Interpol and Europol hinders the integration of Kosovo’s 
police force with the region (Ademi, 2018).  
Less formal initiatives and personal contacts have also intensified throughout the region. Non-
formal communication among police in the region, fostered by the absence of a language barrier 
in the region, is a key element of cooperation, mentoring and experience-sharing (Knezović et 
al., 2018). It can also ensure fast response in the case of alarm announcement about where 
some felon is or where some illegal operation will take place; whereas procedures of the 
Ministries of the Interior may take too long (Knezović et al., 2018). See also the ‘Personal 
contacts’ section under Components of coordination and cooperation.  
For further discussion on police cooperation, see the section on Mechanisms and initiatives- 
Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association and Police cooperation centre. 
Prosecutorial cooperation 
Prosecutors’ networks have also been strengthened in the Western Balkans, as part of EU 
projects, with the key aim of facilitating cross-border investigation and prosecution of organised 
crime and corruption (Güroff and Kazanxhi, 2016). Specific forms of cooperation include the 
development of common investigation mechanisms and strategies against organised crime; 
regular meetings to exchange experiences and best practice findings; and the set-up of a central 
organisation responsible for dealing with mutual legal assistance requests1 (Güroff and 
Kazanxhi, 2016). For further discussion, see: Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group 
in the section on Mechanisms and initiatives. 
Border management  
Border protection is another promising and necessary area of increased cooperation, given 
continuing migration and refugee flows (Dokos, 2017). Regional cooperation in the framework of 
                                                   
1 Mutual legal assistance (MLA) in criminal matters is a process by which States seek for and provide assistance 
to other States in servicing of judicial document and gathering evidence for use in criminal cases. See: 
https://www.unodc.org/e4j/en/organized-crime/module-11/key-issues/mutual-legal-assistance.html  
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border security is regulated through bi- and multilateral agreements. These contain provisions 
centred on the opening of shared border crossing points, joint operations and joint patrolling, the 
exchange of information, and the opening of Police Cooperation Centres (Boshnjaku, 2017). 
There is currently joint patrolling with Montenegro, Kosovo and North Macedonia according to the 
schedule defined in cooperation between parties (Boshnjaku, 2017). 
Cross-cutting: Gender-based violence 
There have been some improvements in coordination at the country level in the Western Balkans 
to address gender-based violence. In North Macedonia, for example, the National Coordinative 
Body for combating Domestic Violence was established in 2018. It is tasked with monitoring and 
analysing the national situation regarding domestic violence; coordinating the activities of the 
competent institutions; and proposing measures to combat such violence (Tadić et al., 2018). In 
Serbia, the Law on the Prevention of Domestic Violence has introduced various measures, 
including mandatory coordination and cooperation between services and institutions; and the 
establishment of a unified central electronic database on domestic violence (Tadić et al., 2018). In 
contrast, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is no comprehensive and harmonised system for 
monitoring and data collection on cases of violence against women. Methodologies and 
institutions for monitoring and collecting data differ between the Federation and Republika 
Srpska. There is no evidence of cooperation or data exchange between the two entities (Tadić et 
al., 2018). 
4. Components of coordination and cooperation 
Frameworks 
Efforts to promote transborder law enforcement and regional cooperation in security and justice 
sectors have benefited from legislative harmonisation, bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements and 
international conventions (Bechev et al., 2015). All countries of the region have signed the most 
important international conventions that facilitate common work (Knezović et al., 2018). In the 
field of regional police cooperation, for example, the existence of various signed agreements 
equip the states in the Western Balkans with a broad set of instruments to rely upon to deepen 
and widen cooperation. This includes operative cooperation, tactical cooperation, research 
cooperation and the development of shared approaches to fight against specific issues (Knezović 
et al., 2018). 
Joint investigation teams 
Joint investigation teams (JITs) are an established effective cooperation tool aimed at tackling 
transborder crime. Comprised of professionals from police, customs and judicial authorities, they 
are crucial to strengthening transborder cooperation in conducting investigations, and to securing 
timely data collection and exchange of information and evidence (Lestanin and Nikac, 2019; IOM, 
2015). They also allow for the sharing of experiences and best practices during the investigation, 
alongside the application of a multidisciplinary approach to problem solving (Lestanin and Nikac, 
2019). Investigative activities are conducted jointly on the territory of one of the countries that 
participate in the JIT (IOM, 2015).  
Alongside JITs, joint parallel investigations are considered a key tool for effective cross-border 
cooperation in investigating human trafficking and migrant smuggling cases (IOM, 2015).  They 
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involve authorities conducting investigations autonomously in their territory of jurisdiction but in a 
coordinated and parallel way (IOM, 2015). 
Joint database and risk analysis 
A joint operational database on cases of organised crime, such as human trafficking and migrant 
smuggling cases at the regional level, could support investigations and contribute to improved 
knowledge and capacities of all operators. It includes statistics on the profiles of the cases and 
perpetrators (IOM, 2015). Joint databases can also improve and converge the respective 
national operations and methods applied in the region to identify cases (IOM, 2015). 
The comprehensive collection and processing of available information and statistics on identified 
and processed cases could also allow for in-depth joint risk analysis, conducted by all the 
countries in the region (IOM, 2015). This would enable the development of an effective 
transborder response that is harmonised, tailored and up-to-date in identifying cases of human 
trafficking and migrant smuggling (IOM, 2015). 
Joint training and educational activities 
Following regional risk analysis exercises, joint training and other educational activities should be 
designed and conducted regularly for institutions and officials throughout the region involved in 
relevant security and justice work (IOM, 2015). Such training and activities should present best 
practices on how to detect, approach and tackle key issues, alongside the new procedures and 
referral mechanisms devised in order to adjust the institutional response to countering security 
threats (IOM, 2015). 
Ongoing joint seminars for staff of security institutions throughout the Western Balkans (mainly 
among neighbouring countries) can help to harmonise approaches, share information, exchange 
experiences, build mutual trust and improve levels of cooperation (Bačanović and Hristovski, 
2018). 
Information sharing 
Effective, simple, and fluid exchanges of information between the stakeholders of different 
countries is required. At the same time, information exchange procedures need to respect the 
principle of national security, public stability and safety, principle to protect data and prevention of 
information leaks (IOM, 2015). Experience sharing and information exchange can be facilitated 
through regular meetings among representatives of law enforcement agencies and judiciary from 
neighbouring countries (see joint training section above); through a network of experts; and via 
the upgrading and improvement of secure data transmission systems (IOM, 2015). 
Personal contacts 
Personal contacts and the non-formal dimension of cooperation, including experience sharing, 
can be a key element of successful cooperation. In the police sector, for example, personal 
contacts have made cooperation faster, easier and more effective. They have played an 
important role within the framework of the Southeast European Police Chiefs Association 
(SEPCA) (Knezović et al., 2018). For further discussion, see the police cooperation section. 
The ability to network and develop contacts with colleagues from the other countries is not, 
however, necessarily a natural feature of all people. As such, the selection of officers responsible 
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for developing and maintaining contacts should be processed very carefully (Knezović et al., 
2018). It is also important to ensure that officers act in the national interest and not in his/her 
personal one. In addition, it is necessary to address issues of continuity in the bureaucratic 
structures, should personal contacts gain too much prominence (Knezović et al., 2018). 
5. Mechanisms and initiatives for coordination and 
cooperation 
Regional level coordination and cooperation is facilitated and supported by various regional 
platforms, such as regional centres and hubs; policy-level and operational-level networks; 
international projects and initiatives dedicated to fostering regional cooperation; and various 
forms of bilateral technical and other assistance (Đorđević et al., 2018; Bechev et al., 2015). The 
use of these platforms can enhance and strengthen the mechanisms of transborder cooperation 
and the capacities and skills of relevant stakeholders from each country (IOM, 2015). 
Despite the existence of a variety of types of platforms and initiatives, cooperation is still heavily 
externally driven, mainly by the EU, and is to some extent donor-dependent. Countries within the 
Western Balkans are more likely to engage and contribute to an initiative if it functions effectively 
and produces results (Bechev et al., 2015).  
The Stability Pact – Regional Cooperation Council (RCC) 
The Stability Pact was established in 1999 at the initiative of the European Union with the aim of 
establishing and reinforcing peace and security in Southeastern Europe. It brought together 
participants from the Western Balkan and neighbouring countries, EU member states, and key 
international organisations and financial institutions.  The primary method of cooperation were 
the regularly-held conferences dealing with the matters of importance to the idea of regional 
cooperation (Paszkiewicz, 2009). The Stability Pact was superseded by the Regional 
Cooperation Council in 2008. Its main goal is to support, coordinate and consolidate the main 
fields of regional cooperation in Southeastern Europe, including security and justice 
(Paszkiewicz, 2009).  
There are four law enforcement initiatives that were established by the Stability Pact: Migration, 
Asylum, and Refugee Regional Initiative (MARRI), Regional Anticorruption Initiative (RAI), 
Southeast European Cooperation Initiative – Regional Centre for Combating Trans-border Crime 
(SECI Centre) and Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG). These centres 
contribute to the advancement and sustainability of regional cooperation in justice and security 
(Bechev et al., 2015). They are each discussed below. 
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI)/ Southeast 
European Law Enforcement Centre (SELEC) 
SECI was launched in 1996, with the main task of bringing together law enforcement forces of 13 
countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, North 
Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia and Turkey) with the aim of 
strengthening the fight against transborder organised crime. The Centre provides significant 
support to national (state) customs and law enforcement agencies by offering a reliable 
environment for collecting, analysing and sharing information and criminal intelligence in real 
time; knowledge development; threat assessment; joint planning and common action in the field 
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of transborder crime. It contributes to coordination of regional operations and supports 
investigations and crime prevention activities of the member states in transborder cases. In 
2010/2011 the SECI Centre was transformed to SELEC (Southeast European Law Enforcement 
Centre (Kostadinović, 2017; Güroff and Kazanxhi, 2016; Maksimovic et al., 2015; Prezelj, 2013).  
SELEC represents a significantly successful regional initiative. One of its most relevant outputs 
has been the Southeast European Organised Crime Threat Assessment, modelled after 
methodology adopted in the EU. In addition, Operation Mrak is an example of a successful 
operation that relied on strong multilateral police cooperation in the Western Balkans, facilitated 
by SELEC. The Slovenian criminal police identified an organised criminal group in Slovenia with 
strong connections with the Albanian organised criminal groups in North Macedonia, engaging in 
smuggling of drugs and weapons from North Macedonia and Italy. The ensuring operation 
involved the police forces of Slovenia, North Macedonia, Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia and Italy. 
Their cooperation resulted in the exposure of the entire network of smugglers and traffickers 
(Prezelj, 2013).  
Regional Anticorruption Initiative (RAI) 
The RAI (previously SPOC) was established in 2000 and renamed in 2007. It is the only regional 
centre devoted solely to fighting corruption, with the main task of improving regional efforts 
through various means, including: adopting and implementing international anti-corruption 
instruments and implementing regional agreements; promoting good governance; strengthening 
national legislation and promoting the rule of law; and promoting an active civil society and 
raising public awareness. It brings together governments of the region, local and international 
civil society organisations, bilateral aid agencies, and international organisations (Kostadinović, 
2017; Prezelj, 2013). 
Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI) 
MARRI, established in 2004, has been tasked with the creation of an integrated system of border 
traffic control in the Western Balkans. The objective of MARRI and its Centre is to contribute to 
the orderly and free movement of people in the interest of security and prosperity in the areas of: 
migration, asylum, integrated border management, visa policy and consular cooperation, 
return/settlement of refugees/displaced persons (Paszkiewicz, 2009; Kostadinović, 2017).  
The Police Cooperation Convention for Southeast Europe, signed by Balkan countries in 2006, is 
designed to unify regulations for the border control and create a management system for wanted 
persons and objects (Paszkiewicz, 2009; Kostadinović, 2017).  
Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA) 
SEPCA, formed in 2002, facilitates regional police cooperation among its members and supports 
the transformation and reform of police services to foster public security. One outcome of SEPCA 
is the creation of the Women Police Officer Networks (WPON) advancing women in police and 
gender mainstreaming of police practices. There is a Secretariat that follows the implementation 
of the Police Cooperation Convention, with the aim of police cooperation (e.g. joint threat 
analysis, hot pursuit, witness protection, cross-border surveillance, undercover and other forms 
of investigations (Güroff and Kazanxhi, 2016; Bechev et al., 2015). 
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Police Cooperation Centre (PCC) 
Joint cooperation centres can facilitate and strengthen cooperation among various actors. A 
trilateral Police Cooperation Centre (PCC), established in BiH, for example, facilitates 
cooperation among the border police of BiH, Serbia and Montenegro (IOM, 2015). In addition to 
being a mechanism for sharing and exchanging information, the PCC can facilitate the conduct of 
joint and coordinated operations between the agencies that participate in the centre. This could 
include, for example, joint patrolling conducted by law enforcement agencies from neighbouring 
countries or hot pursuit of a suspected case once he or she crosses the border. Such operations 
could help to prevent and detect the micro-organisations that run various illegal cross-border 
activities (IOM, 2015).  
Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG) 
SEEPAG, constituted in 2003, is a network of experienced prosecutors that provide legal 
assistance, advice and guidance to SEELAC in investigation of transborder organised crime. The 
network consists in National Prosecutorial Focal Points established in each member state with 
the task of facilitating judicial cooperation between member states. It enhances the cooperation 
and coordination between national investigating and prosecuting authorities. This allows law 
enforcement agencies to act more effectively when dealing with transborder crime and to bring 
criminals to justice faster. This can be through timely exchange of information and evidence, 
through formal MLA requests, or through more informal channels of communication.2 
While the work of SEEPAG is financed by the United States, the Council of Europe supports the 
Western Balkans Prosecutor’s Network. Greater coordination between the two regional initiatives 
for prosecutors’ cooperation is required (Bechev et al., 2015). 
The South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the 
Control of Small Arms and Light Weapon (SEESAC) 
SEESAC, established in 2002 as a joint initiative of the UNDP and the Regional Cooperation 
Council, is a focal point for activities related to small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the 
region. It works with national governments to adopt a holistic approach to SALW, implementing a 
wide range of activities. These include: campaigns of SALW awareness activities; development 
of open bilateral and multilateral channels of communication with all relevant stakeholders (e.g. 
through regional forums); collection of SALW; inventory management; enhanced monitoring and 
border control; and improved control of arms exports (Kostadinović, 2017; Bechev et al., 2015).  
It has become a competent regional body and has developed a unique capacity and experience 
in implementing regional interventions with several governments, in line with the common policy 
in the region (Kostadinović, 2017; Bechev et al., 2015). It has been effective in reducing the 
indirect threat arising from the continued presence of weapons after the end of wars, including 
the threat of organised crime and terrorism in the Western Balkans and beyond (Prezelj, 2013). 
                                                   
2 See: https://www.selec.org/about-seepag/  
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Integrative Internal Security Governance (IISG) 
The IISG, launched in 2017, is a new approach to internal security governance capacity-building 
and reform introduced in the Western Balkan. The concept enables a coordinated, aligned and 
sustainable effort in internal security governance reform on the part of the EU and all relevant 
international donors of external assistance (UNODC, 2019). It seeks to promote strategic 
guidance and coordination to regional operational law enforcement policy, aspects of which have 
already been supported by various donors (Đorđević et al., 2018). 
There is wide support for the concept of the IISG as a potentially effective tools for regional 
coordination. Its work is promoting informal collaboration and trust-building among beneficiaries 
across the region. It works with police, prosecutors, joint investigation teams and other actors in 
security and justice (UNODC, 2019).  
The IISG has paved the way for new policy solutions, such as an internal security policy cycle in 
the Western Balkans that is based on an understanding of the region’s own ability to counter 
security challenges. The focus is more on truly efficient horizontal regional cooperation, rather 
than on joining Euro-Atlantic integrations and establishing vertical mechanisms of cooperation 
with the Western Balkans based on conditionality (Đorđević et al., 2018). 
It was recently announced that the IISG has endorsed a functional merger with the RCC as of 
April 2020. This is expected to contribute to greater coherence in security cooperation activities 
of the region.3 
Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism initiative (WBCTi)   
The WBCTi was initiated in 2015 to address deficiencies in combatting serious organised crime 
and gaps in regional cooperation mechanisms. Since mid-2014, the issue of counterterrorism 
has become central at the EU again and the Western Balkans has re-emerged as a key region in 
terms of security. The agenda has been pursued by numerous actors and donors and there have 
been problems with lack of coordination and complementarity and with duplications in efforts 
(Đorđević et al., 2018).  
The initiative presents a joint, coordinated approach to regional cooperation in the region and 
seeks to integrate international assistance designed to raise the region’s capacity to prevent and 
combat terrorism, violent extremism, and radicalisation leading to terrorism. It aims to minimise 
duplication and overlapping of actions of international actors by encouraging partners to consult 
with the tool before planning new activities and to jointly prioritise actions (UNODC, 2019; 
Đorđević et al., 2018). It adopts a multilevel policy coordination mechanism, which includes three 
levels of mutually linked and interoperable regional platforms: strategic policy level network, 
facilitated by the RCC; operational cooperation and response in police and intelligence services; 
and networks of police operatives engaging in cross-border operational cooperation (Đorđević et 
al., 2018).  The multilevel platform has resulted in increased engagement with Europol and 
                                                   
3 RCC. (2019). Integrative Internal Security Governance (IISG) Board has endorsed functional merger with the 
RCC as of April 2020. https://berlinprocess.info/integrative-internal-security-governance-iisg-board-has-endorsed-
functional-merger-with-the-rcc-as-of-april-2020/ 
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Interpol in efforts related to information exchange, threat assessment, and operational case 
analysis (Đorđević et al., 2018). 
The initiative facilitates joint meetings of all relevant Western Balkan officials to provide 
information exchange and conduct coordination, exposing gaps and engaging all relevant levels 
to eliminate them. Joint meetings also promote sharing of expertise and good practice among 
regional partners and counterparts (Đorđević et al., 2018). 
The WBCTi is considered to be an efficient form of regional security cooperation. It has 
contributed to a new security framework aimed at addressing complex regional security issues; 
linked the mandates and objectives of regional stakeholders; and enhanced communication and 
mutual trust between them at all levels of policy implementation. This complements the EU 
integration process (Đorđević et al., 2018). However, the WBCTi is an example of a locally driven 
initiative, which arose after beneficiary countries themselves voiced concerns and the need for 
such a mechanism. This was endorsed by several regional political frameworks. Only then did 
the EC become involved in support of it (Đorđević et al., 2018). Under the IISG mechanism, the 
WBCTi has extended to two other areas to internal security: the Western Balkan Counter-Serious 
Crime Initiative (WBCSCi) and the Western Balkan Border Security Initiative (WBBSi) (UNODC, 
2019). 
The Horizontal Facility   
The European Union/Council of Europe Horizontal Facility for the Western Balkans and Turkey 
(Horizontal Facility II) 2019-2022 is a cooperation initiative of the European Union and Council of 
Europe for the Western Balkans and Turkey.4 The first phase of the programme ran from 2016-
2019. Themes covered by the Horizontal Facility include: ensuring justice; fighting economic 
crime; combating discrimination and protecting the rights of vulnerable groups; and freedom of 
expression and of the media. The Expertise Coordination Mechanism remains an important 
feature of the programme. It provides legislative expertise and policy advice aimed at addressing 
any shortcomings in the thematic areas covered. These shortcomings are identified by Council of 
Europe monitoring bodies. 
Phase two of the programme will enhance the regional dimension, allowing for a cross-border 
exchange on addressing common problems, sharing best practices and establishing platforms 
and networks to address the issues. 
6. Select challenges to regional cooperation 
Translating frameworks into action 
The strategic documents of Western Balkan countries state that regional cooperation is essential 
to their national and overall regional security – and in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration 
(Jakešević, 2019). Some studies conducted on regional cooperation within the Western Balkans 
find, however, that cooperation in some fields of security lack coordination and efficiency, due in 
large part to low rates of implementation. In such contexts, cooperation remains primarily 
declaratory, without consistent implementation on the ground (Đorđević et al., 2018; Prezelj, 
                                                   
4 https://www.coe.int/en/web/ankara/horizontal-facility-for-the-western-balkans-and-turkey 
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2013). Cooperation in some areas of the police sector, for example, appear to have been 
adopted solely on paper, rather than in practical action (Knezović et al., 2018).  
Trust issues 
Trust is of tremendous importance in the field of security (Knezović et al., 2018). A number of 
Western Balkan countries have experienced a shared conflicted past. In such a context, 
discussions of security and security sectors can frequently be fuelled by ethnic nationalism 
(Emini and Marku, 2019; Ademi, 2018). There is ongoing distrust among regional actors, 
including a lack of trust to share information in sensitive areas (Emini and Marku, 2019; 
Jakešević, 2019). This is a key obstacle in fostering transborder cooperation in the field of 
security (Emini and Marku, 2019; Ademi, 2018). Thus, regional initiatives are often more likely to 
be effective if they involve joint work in a less sensitive field of action and/or at a relatively low 
level (Emini and Marku, 2019). 
Security community and regional identity 
A “security community” – an enhanced sense of cooperation, trust and reciprocity, among and 
between countries, is recognised as essential for maintaining peace (Cruise and Grillot, 2013). 
Members of a security community view each other as partners, which tends to minimise the 
prospect of violent conflict. While research on the Western Balkans has often focused on elite-
level, government to government cooperation, the development of a security community must 
extend to the public-level. Public-level security community can be inconsistent, or in some areas, 
entirely lacking (Cruise and Grillot, 2013). A study of the police sector in Croatia finds, for 
example, that it is difficult to detect all the indicators that would demonstrate the existence of a 
security community in the Western Balkans. While there were compatibilities in terms of values 
and mutual responsiveness, a generalized common identity, a sense of “we-ness” feeling for the 
region, and loyalty is lacking (Knezović et al., 2018).  
A weak sense of regional identity, despite geographic proximity, common history, cultural and 
social cohesiveness and common problems of transition, have contributed to poor levels of 
regional ownership and undermines regional cooperation (Prezelj, 2013; Kušljugić, 2009). 
For further discussion, see: Building public community level trust and cooperation in the Select 
recommendations section. 
Varying levels of development 
Differences in progress made by the individual states in the Western Balkans in their integration 
processes and in their implementation of international norms and standards is an obstacle to 
regional cooperation. For example, by becoming an EU member state, Croatia was obligated to 
adopt particular standards of border control, which have not yet been adopted by other countries 
in the region. These can undermine the cooperation of border police among neighbouring 
countries (Knezović et al., 2018). Some countries in the region have also not passed particular 
information security laws, which creates serious difficulties in processes of cooperation with 
Croatia or other EU member states that have adopted such laws and normative requirements 
(Knezović et al., 2018). 
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7. Select recommendations 
Training 
Security sector-related agencies urgently need new training methods that can provide them with 
new skills and cutting-edge technologies; and new organisational structures that can foster 
changes in mentality. This is essential for dealing with complex, transborder security problems 
and in enhancing inter-agency, bilateral and multilateral cooperation (Dokos, 2017). At the same 
time, it is important to recognise that police, prosecutors and other security and justice officials in 
the Western Balkans have much expertise, which can be relied upon in designing training 
activities (UNODC, 2019). 
Interactions and sharing of experiences 
It is important to continue to develop inter-institutional cooperation within and among states by 
sharing and exchanging good practices and experience (Bačanović and Hristovski, 2018). Such 
sharing of experiences and interactions should also take place at the public level – between 
independent professionals – academics or civil society actors (Emini and Marku, 2019). This can 
be particularly important in cases where bilateral cooperation on the state level is almost non-
existent, such as in the case of Kosovo, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Emini and Marku, 
2019). It can also help to foster a greater sense of security community (see the Challenges 
section above).  
Building trust and a security community 
Efforts need to be made to address distrust among populations and to foster a shared sense of 
identity, in order to promote a security community among citizens and to enhance regional 
cooperation (Cruise and Grillot, 2013). (See the Security community and regional identity section 
under Challenges). 
Given the existing interaction between governing officials, even between the officials of countries 
with long standing disputes such as Serbia and Croatia, elites are well placed to encourage and 
foster security community among the public. Governments should encourage and foster greater 
interaction within and among their populations.  This could be through support for local 
programmes that encourage partnership and interactions between countries or ethnic groups 
(Cruise and Grillot, 2013). Media campaigns that promote commonality and solicit cooperation 
among the citizens of the region can also be an effective tool to foster a regional identity (Cruise 
and Grillot, 2013). International actors can also continue to play a role in funding and supporting 
local community development projects that aim to bridge ethnic and country divides through 
increased interaction and programming (Cruise and Grillot, 2013).  
Contact person/coordination unit 
Establishing or strengthening the role of national authorised contact persons or units (to address 
the issue of turnover) for cooperation and information exchange could help to improve internal 
cooperation in a country in combating organised crime (IOM, 2015). Each institution involved, for 
example, in the identification and investigation of human trafficking and migrant smuggling cases 
(law enforcement agencies, prosecutors’ office, labour inspection etc.) should appoint an 
authorised officer or unit responsible for cooperation with other bodies and operators to function 
properly (IOM, 2015).  
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In order to strengthen transborder exchanges of information, each country in the region could 
also appoint contact persons or units in order to manage the international flow of information and 
coordination of joint regional and multilateral activities. All information and activities conducted by 
any national actor within the scope of regional cooperation would go through the contact person 
or unit (IOM, 2015). This is the case, for example, with the Western Balkan Counter-Terrorism 
initiative (see Mechanisms and initiatives section), whereby partners are encouraged to consult 
with the tool before planning new activities. 
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